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Abstract. Today’s distributed systems need runtime error detection to catch 
errors arising from software bugs, hardware errors, or unexpected operating 
conditions. A prominent class of error detection techniques operates in a 
stateful manner, i.e., it keeps track of the state of the application being 
monitored and then matches state-based rules. Large-scale distributed 
applications generate a high volume of messages that can overwhelm the 
capacity of a stateful detection system. An existing approach to handle this is to 
randomly sample the messages and process the subset. However, this approach, 
leads to non-determinism with respect to the detection system’s view of what 
state the application is in. This in turn leads to degradation in the quality of 
detection. We present an intelligent sampling and Hidden Markov Model 
(HMM)-based technique to select the messages and states that the detection 
system processes such that the non-determinism is minimized. We also present 
a mechanism for selecting computationally intensive rules to match based on 
the likelihood of detecting an error if a rule is completely matched. We 
demonstrate the techniques in a detection system called Monitor applied to a 
J2EE distributed online banking application. We empirically evaluate the 
performance of Monitor under different load conditions and compare it to a 
previous system called Pinpoint. 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Motivation 
Increased deployment of high-speed computer networks has made distributed 
applications ubiquitous in today’s connected world. Many of these distributed 
applications provide critical functionality with real-time requirements. These require 
online error detection functionality for errors at the application level.  
Error detection can be classified as stateless or stateful detection. In the former, 
detection is done on individual messages by matching certain characteristics of the 
message, for example, finding specific signatures in the payload of network packets. 
A more powerful approach is stateful error detection, in which the error detection 
system builds up knowledge of the application state by collecting information from 
multiple application messages. The stateful error detection system then matches 
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behavior-based rules, based on the application’s state rather than on instantaneous 
information. For simplicity, we refer to error detection as just detection in this paper. 
Stateful detection is looked upon as a powerful mechanism for building dependable 
distributed systems [1][12]. However, scaling a stateful detection system with 
increasing rate of messages is a challenge. The increasing rate may happen due to a 
greater number of application components and increasing load from these 
components. The stress on the detection system is due to the increased processing 
load of tracking the application state and performing rule matching. The rules can be 
heavy-duty and can impose large overhead for matching. Thus the stateful detection 
system has to be designed such that the resource usage, primarily computation and 
memory, is minimized. Simply throwing more hardware at the problem is not enough 
because applications also scale up demanding more from the detection system. 
In prior work, we have presented Monitor [12] which provides stateful detection by 
observing the messages exchanged between application components. Monitor is 
provided with a representation of the application (or protocol) behavior using a finite 
state machine (FSM) along with a set of normal behavior rules. A simple example of 
a rule for a three-tier e-commerce system is that a request submitted to authenticate a 
purchase request should complete within a user-specified time bound. Monitor uses 
an observer model whereby it observes the inter-component interactions, but does not 
have any knowledge of the internal state of a component. Monitor performs two 
primary tasks on observing a message. First, it deduces the application state by 
performing a state transition based on the observed message. Second, it performs rule 
matching for the rules associated with the particular state and observed message.  
We have observed that Monitor has a breaking point in terms of the rate of 
messages it has to process [12]. Beyond this breaking point, there is a sharp drop in 
accuracy or rise in latency (i.e., the time spent in rule matching) due to an overload 
caused by the high incoming rate of messages. All detection systems that perform 
stateful detection at the application level are expected to have such a breaking point, 
though the rate of messages at which each system breaks will be different. For 
example, the stateful network intrusion detection system (NIDS) Snort running on a 
general-purpose CPU can process traffic up to 500 Mbps [21]. A higher traffic rate 
exhausts its CPU and memory resources leading to packet losses and an increase of 
false alarms. For Monitor, we have observed through experimentation that the 
breaking point on a standard Linux box is 100 packets/sec [12]. 
We have shown in previous work [13] that we can reduce the processing load in 
Monitor by randomly sampling the incoming messages. The load per unit time in a 
detection system is given by the incoming message rate × processing overhead per 
message. Thus, processing only a subset of messages by sampling them reduces the 
overall load. However, sampling introduces non-determinism in the sense that the 
Monitor is no longer aware of the exact state the application is in. In sampling mode, 
messages are either sampled (and processed) or dropped. When a message is dropped, 
Monitor loses track of which state the application is in. This causes inaccuracies in 
selecting the rules to match since the rules are based on the application state and the 
observed message. This leads to lower quality of detection, as measured by accuracy 
(the fraction of actual errors that is detected) and precision (the complement of false 
alarms). 
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1.2 Our contributions 
We propose an intelligent sampling technique to reduce the non-determinism caused 
by random sampling in stateful detection systems. This technique is based on the 
observation that in an application’s FSM, a message type can be seen as a state 
transition in multiple states. For example, a call to the addressLookUp function to 
look up the address information of an e-commerce site’s consumer may be made from 
different components. Therefore, different message types differ in their ability to 
pinpoint which possible states the application is in. Computation of this 
discriminating property of the messages is done offline from the FSM of the 
application, which in turn is automatically generated through training traces. With 
intelligent sampling, Monitor observes all messages at runtime, but selectively 
samples and processes the messages with a high discriminating property, thereby 
limiting the non-determinism.  
Even with the proper selection of messages, there is remaining non-determinism 
about the application state. Therefore, we propose a Hidden Markov Model (HMM)-
based technique to estimate the likelihood of the different application states given an 
observed sequence of messages and perform rule matching for only the more likely 
states. This involves prior training of the model with representative application traces, 
a challenge but nevertheless used in many detection systems [5][8]. We show that the 
two techniques⎯intelligent sampling and HMM-based filtering⎯make Monitor scale 
to an application with a high load, with only a small degradation in detection quality.  
For the evaluation, we use a distributed J2EE online banking application, the 
Duke’s Bank application [15], running on Glassfish, the open source Sun Application 
Server [16]. Glassfish is comprised of a web container, an EJB container, and a back-
end database. We inject errors in pairs of the combination (component, method), 
where ‘component’ can be a Java Server Page (JSP), servlet, or Enterprise Java Bean 
(EJB), and ‘method’ is a function call in the component. The injected errors can cause 
failures in the web interaction in which this combination is touched, for example, by 
delaying the completion of the web interaction or by prematurely terminating a web 
interaction without the expected response to the user. Our comparison points are 
Pinpoint [8] for detecting anomalies in the structure of web interactions and Monitor 
with random sampling [13]. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present background 
material on stateful detection. In Sections 3 and 4, we present the intelligent sampling 
and HMM-based application state estimation algorithms. In Section 5 we explain our 
experimental testbed and in Section 6, the experiments. In Section 7 we review related 
work and in Section 9 we present the conclusions and limitations of this work. 
2 Background 
In previous work we developed Monitor, a framework for online error detection in 
distributed applications [12]. Online implies the detection happens when the 
application is executing. Monitor is said to verify the application’s components by 
observing the messages exchanged between the components. Monitor performs error 
detection under the principle of black-box instrumentation, i.e., the application does 
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not have to be changed to allow Monitor to detect errors. This permits error detection 
to be applied to third party applications where source code is unavailable.  
2.1 Fault Model 
Monitor can detect any error that manifests itself as a deviation from the 
application’s model and expected behavior that is given to the Monitor as input—a 
Finite State Machine (FSM) and a set of application-level behavior-based rules. We 
define a web interaction as the set of inter-component messages that are caused by a 
user request. The end point of the interaction is marked by the response back to the 
user. In the context of component-based web applications, an FSM is used to pinpoint 
deviations in the structure of the observed web interactions, while rules are used to 
determine deviations from the expected normal behavior of application’s components.  
2.2 Stateful Detection 
Monitor is provided a representation of the application behavior through an FSM 
that can be generated from a human-specified description (e.g., a protocol 
specification), or from analysis of application observations (e.g., function call traces, 
as done here). Recent techniques for deriving the logic of low-level programs through 
an FSM have been proposed in [19]. In our current system, transitions are caused by 
method invocations on components and method returns. In addition, a behavior-based 
rulebase is provided to Monitor. Rules can be derived from the application 
specification or specified from QoS conditions required by the application’s 
administrator. These rules can verify delays in components, or values of state 
variables. We explain more about rule types in Section 2.4 but the issue of how to 
generate appropriate rules is outside the scope of this paper. 
When observing an application component’s message, Monitor performs two 
primary tasks. First, it performs a state transition according to the FSM and the 
observed message. This allows Monitor to infer the current state of the application. 
Second, it matches rules associated with the particular state of the application and the 
observed message. If it is determined that the application does not satisfy a rule, an 
alarm is signaled. 
 
Fig. 1. Monitor architecture. One-sided and two-sided arrows show unidirectional and 
bidirectional flow of information respectively. Gray boxes indicate new components added to 
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Monitor architecture consists of three primary components, as shown in Fig. 1 the 
PacketCapturer engine, the StateMaintainer engine, and the RuleMatching engine. 
Each component executes in a separate thread. Other components of the architecture 
are described in [12].  
The PacketCapturer engine is in charge of capturing the messages exchanged 
between the application components, which could be done through middleware 
forwarding (as done here) or through network assist (such as, port forwarding or using 
a broadcast medium). When Monitor receives a rate of incoming messages close to 
the maximum rate that it can handle, the PacketCapturer is responsible for 
activating a sampling mechanism to reduce the workload for state transition and rule 
matching. In previous work [13] we showed that a random sampling approach helps 
in reducing Monitor’s workload when experiencing high incoming rates of messages.  
We define the term sampling here as we will use it for the rest of the paper. An 
incoming message into Monitor may be sampled, meaning, it will be processed 
further with the two important steps mentioned above (performing a state transition 
and matching rules based on that message), or it may be dropped. In random 
sampling, messages are sampled randomly without looking at the type or content of 
the message, which makes it a lightweight operation. In [12] we have observed that 
under non-sampling conditions, Monitor’s accuracy and precision suffer when the rate 
of incoming messages reaches a particular point which is denoted as Rth. Therefore, 
random sampling is activated at any rate R > Rth, in which Monitor drops messages 
uniformly with a rate of one every (R / (R − Rth) ) messages. 
Sampled messages are passed to the StateMaintainer engine in order to 
perform state transitions according to the application’s FSM. For each received 
message, the StateMaintainer engine is in charge of determining which states 
the application may be in. This is called the state vector and represented by ω. Here, 
the events are messages from the application that are observed at Monitor. When 
Monitor is in non-sampling mode, the state vector typically contains only one state 
since Monitor has an almost-complete view of the events generated in the application. 
Therefore it can infer the actual application’s state, giving |ω|=1. However, when 
sampling mode is activated, Monitor loses track of the actual state of the application 
since it is not observing every event generated by the application. In this scenario, ω 
ends up with a set of the possible states in which the application can be in, given the 
number of dropped messages. Once a message m is sampled, ω is updated. This is 
performed by observing (in the FSM) the new state (or states) to where the 
application could have moved, from each state in ω given m. We define this 
mechanism as pruning the state vector and it is explained in further detail in Section 
3.1. Typically, when ω is pruned, its size is reduced.  
The RuleMatching engine is responsible for matching rules associated with the 
state(s) in ω. 
A challenge in Monitor, when performing random sampling, is to maintain high 
levels of accuracy and precision even while dropping messages. Two cases illustrate 
this degradation. First, if ω does not contain the correct application state Si, and a 
failure occurs in Si, Monitor will have a missed alarm since no rules will be applied to 
Si. This leads to a reduction in accuracy. Second, if ω contains a large number of 
incorrect states—states where the application is not in—false alarms will increase. 
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Due to the randomness of the sampling approach proposed in [13], we obtained a 
maximum accuracy of 0.7 when detecting failures in TRAM, a reliable multicast 
protocol. Systems running critical services often demand higher levels of accuracy 
while having low detection latency. 
2.3 Building FSM from Traces 
We build an FSM for the Duke’s Bank Application by obtaining traces from the 
application when it is exercised with a given workload. A state Si in the FSM is 
defined as a tuple (component, method). In the rest of the paper we use the term 
subcomponent to denote the tuple (component, method). The rationale for this level of 
granularity is to be able to pinpoint performance problems or errors in particular 
methods, rather than only in components. A state change is caused by a call or return 
event within two subcomponents. We create the FSM by imposing a workload on the 
application which consists of as nearly an exhaustive list of transactions supported in 
the application as possible. We cannot claim this is exhaustive since it is manually 
done and no rigorous mechanism is used to guarantee completeness.  
The FSM for Duke’s Bank has 31 states and 62 events (2×31 because of calls and 
returns). When we generate application traces, no error injection is performed and we 
assume that design faults in the application, if any, are not activated, an assumption 
made in many learning-based detection systems [5][8][22]. 
2.4 Rule Types 
In previous work [12] we developed a syntax for rule specification for message-
based applications. We now extend the syntax to be more flexible so that it can be 
applied more naturally to RPC-style component-based applications. 
For detecting performance problems in distributed applications, we use a set of 
temporal rules that characterize allowable response time of subcomponents. The 
response times can be arrived at by various means: (1) a protocol specification may 
specify that a component should acknowledge or reply to a request made from another 
component in a bounded interval of time, (2) a Service Level Agreement (SLA) may 
specify QoS constraints for web services or  service components, (3) models based on 
performance analysis tools, such as Magpie [7], can be used to derive normal 
response time of elements in component-based applications. The other main type of 
rules we use is to verify that values of state variables lie within specified ranges, e.g., 
number of failed authentication attempts must not exceed a threshold.  
3 Handling High Streaming Rates: Intelligent Sampling 
3.1 Sampling in Monitor 
With increasing incoming message rates at Monitor from the application 
components, its overall workload increases leading to higher latency of detection. To 
maintain an acceptable latency, Monitor chooses to process only a fraction of the 
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incoming messages. When a message arrives at the PacketCapturer engine, a 
sampling mechanism is used to decide whether to pass the message to the 
StateMaintainer or not, i.e., whether to sample or to drop the message. If a 
message is sampled, it is then processed by the StateMaintainer to prune the 
state vector, and then by the RuleMatching engine for rule matching. 
When a message is dropped, Monitor cannot determine the correct application state, 
resulting in an undesirable condition, which we call state non-determinism. As an 
example, consider an FSM fragment in Fig. 2.. Suppose that the application is in state 
SA at time t1, and that a message is dropped. From the FSM, Monitor determines that 
the application can be in state SB or state SC, so the state vector ω = {SB, SC}. If 
another message is dropped at time t2, ω grows to {SB, SD, SE, SF}. Depending on the 
number of consecutive dropped messages, the state vector can grow to a maximum of 
the total number of states in the FSM. 
    
Fig. 2. A fragment of a Finite State Machine (FSM) to demonstrate non-determinism 
introduced by sampling. 
Monitor’s RuleMatching engine matches rules for all the states in ω. To avoid 
matching rules in incorrect states, Monitor prunes invalid states from the state vector 
once a message is sampled. For example, if the current state vector is {SB, SC} and 
message m2 is sampled, the state vector is reduced to {SB} because this is the only 
possible transition from any state in the state vector given the event m2 (assuming that 
the sampled message is not erroneous). 
A large state vector increases the computational cost since a larger number of 
potentially expensive rules have to be matched leading to high detection latency. For 
example, an expensive rule we encounter in practice is checking consistency of 
multiple database tables. Worse, a large and inaccurate state vector degrades the 
quality of detection through an increase in false alarms and missed alarms. Our goal is 
then to keep the state vector size bounded so that the detection latency does not 
exceed a threshold (Lth), and the detection quality stays acceptable.  
3.2 Intelligent Sampling Approach 
We hypothesize that sampling based on some inherent property of messages from 
the FSM can lead to a reduction in the state vector size when pruning is performed. 
We have observed that messages in the application have different properties with 
respect to the different transitions in the FSM that they appear in. For example, some 
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for example that state vector ω = {SB, SC} at time t2 following Fig. 2.. If m3 is 
sampled, StateMaintainer would prune ω to {SD}, while if m4 is sampled, ω 
would be pruned to {SE, SF}. Thus, the fact that m3 appears in one transition while m4 
appears in two makes a difference to the resulting state vector. We say therefore that 
m3 has a more desired property than m4 in terms of sampling. 
We use an intelligent sampling approach whereby all incoming messages are 
observed, and a subset of messages with a desirable property is sampled; others are 
dropped. A message is observed by determining its type at the application level, 
which determines the transition in the FSM. For our application, type is given by the 
combination (component, method, “call or return”). Sampling a message has the same 
definition as in Section 2.2, i.e., performing state transition and rule matching with the 
message.  
Let us denote by dm, discriminative size, the number of times a message m appears 
in a state transition to different states in the FSM. In the intelligent sampling 
approach, a message with a small dm is desired. The selection of such messages is 
implemented in Monitor through a greedy algorithm which we describe next. 
3.3 Intelligent Sampling Algorithm 
To guarantee that the rate of messages processed by Monitor is less than Rth, it 
samples n messages in a window of m messages, where n < m and the fraction n/m is 
determined by the incoming message rate. Now, given a window of m messages, 
which particular messages should Monitor sample? Ideally, Monitor should wait for n 
messages with a discriminative size less than a particular threshold dth. However, 
since we do not know in advance what the discriminative sizes of messages in the 
future will be, Monitor could end up with no sampled messages at all by the end of 
the window. To address this, Monitor tracks the number of messages seen in the 
window and the number of messages already sampled, in counters numMsgs and 
numSampled respectively. If Monitor reaches a point where the number of remaining 
messages in the window (m − numMsgs) is equal to the number of messages that it 
still needs to sample (n − numSampled) all the remaining messages (m − numMsgs) 
are sampled without looking at their discriminative sizes. We call this point the last 
resort point.  Before reaching the last resort point, Monitor samples only those 
messages with discriminative sizes less than dth; after that, it samples all remaining 
messages in the window. This approach relies on a concurrent process that tracks the 
incoming message rate and triggers a recalculation of m and n when a significant 
change is detected. 
Fig. 3. shows the IntelligentSampling algorithm. The algorithm runs for a 
window of m messages and the main while loop in lines 5-16 examines m messages, 
while the condition in line 6 guarantees that only n messages are sampled. If the last 
resort point is never reached (say the desired messages arrive early in the window), 
the algorithm always runs lines 7-11. Here discriminative size of messages is 
examined and those with dm < dth are sampled. Each message is looked up in a pre-
computed static table which has dm values for all the messages. Otherwise, as a result 
of reaching the last resort point, it runs lines 12-14 where all messages are sampled.  
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IntelligentSampling decides whether to sample or drop a 
message in a window of messages. 
Input:  n: the number of messages that have to be sampled; m: 
size of the window of messages from which we sample n 
messages; table: table with each message and its corresponding 
discriminative size; dth: threshold for the discriminative size of a 
message. 
Variables: currentMsg: current captured message; numMsgs: 
number of messages seen in m; numSampled: number of sampled 
messages; size: discriminative size of a message 
 
IntelligentSampling(n, m,  table, dth): 
1. currentMsg ← getNextMessage( ) 
2. numMsgs ← 0 
3. numSampled ← 0 
4. size ← 0 
5. while (numMsgs < m) then 
6.  if ( numSampled < n ) then 
7.   if ( n – numSampled < m – numMsgs ) then 
8.    size ← discriminativeSize(currentMsg) 
9.    if ( size < dth  in table) then 
10.      SampleMessage(currentMsg) 
11.     numSampled ← numSampled + 1 
12.   else 
13.    SampleMessage (currentMsg) 
14.     numSampled ← numSampled + 1   
15.  currentMsg ← getNextMessage( )  
16.  numMsgs ← numMsgs + 1 
17. return 
 
Fig. 3. Pseudo-code for intelligent sampling algorithm. 
The function SampleMessage passes the message to the StateMaintainer 
for further pruning of the state vector.  
For a window of m messages, the computational cost of this algorithm is O(Km), 
where K is the cost of looking up the discriminative size of a message. We 
implemented table by using a hash-table so the expected time of this search is O(1), 
giving an overall complexity O(m). The space complexity is O(M), where M is the 
count of types of messages in the system.  
4 Reducing Non-Determinism: HMM-based State Vector 
Reduction 
There are two remaining problems when pruning the state vector with the intelligent 
sampling approach. First, when a message is sampled and the state vector is pruned, 
the size of the new state vector can still be large making detection costly and 
inaccurate. This situation arises if the FSM has a large number of states and the FSM 
is highly connected, or if highly discriminative messages are not seen in a window. 
The second disadvantage is that if the sampled message is incorrect, Monitor can end 
up with an incorrect state vector—a state vector that does not contain the actual 
10 Ignacio Laguna, Fahad A. Arshad, David M. Grothe, Saurabh Bagchi 
application’s state. An incorrect message is one that is valid according to the FSM, 
but is incorrect given the current state. For example, in Fig. 2., if state vector ω = {SB, 
SC}, only messages m2, m3, and m4 are correct messages. Incorrect messages can be 
seen due to a buggy component, e.g., a component that makes an unexpected call in 
an error condition. To overcome these difficulties, we propose the use of a Hidden 
Markov Model to determine probabilistically the current application state. 
4.1 Hidden Markov Model 
A Hidden Markov Model (HMM) is an extension of a Markov Model where the 
states in the model are not observable. In a particular state, an outcome, which is 
observable, is generated according to an associated probability distribution.  
The main challenge of Monitor, when handling non-determinism, is to determine 
the correct state of the application when only a subset of messages is sampled. This 
phenomenon can be modeled with an HMM because the correct state of the 
application is hidden from Monitor while the messages are observable. Therefore, we 
use an HMM to determine the probability of the application being in each of its states. 
In a subsequent stage, Monitor prunes states from the state vector that have low 
probability values. 
An HMM [14] is characterized by the set of states, a set of observation symbols, the 
state transition probability distribution A, the observation probability distribution B 
(given a state i, what is the probability of observation j), and the initial state 
probability distribution π. We use λ = (A, B, π) as a compact notation for the HMM. 
We used the Baum-Welch algorithm [14] to estimate HMM parameters to model the 
Duke’s Bank application. The HMM is trained with a set of traces from the 
application which is obtained by imposing a load of concurrent users for about 5 
minutes. These are the same set of traces used to build the application FSM. We 
attempt to produce a complete list of all the web interactions that can occur in the 
application. The Baum-Welch algorithm starts with a uniform probability distribution 
for all states and edges and refines it using the traces. 
4.2 Algorithm for Reducing the State Vector using HMM 
We have implemented the ReduceStateVector algorithm (Fig. 4) for reducing 
the state vector using an HMM. When Monitor samples a message, it asks the HMM 
for the k most probable application states. Monitor then intersects the previous state 
vector with the set of k most probable states. Then an updated state vector is 
computed from the FSM using pruning (as defined in Section 2.2), i.e., by asking the 
FSM that given the set of states from the intersection and the sampled message, what 
are the possible next states.  
The HMM is implemented in Monitor in the frontend thread, the 
PacketCapturer. Thus, the HMM observes all messages since they are needed to 
build complete sequences of observations.  
The ReduceStateVector algorithm consists of three steps: 
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─ Step 1: Calculate what is the probability that, after seeing a sequence of 
messages O, the application is in each of the possible states s1, … sN? This is 
expressed as P(qt = si | O, λ). This step produces a vector of probabilities μt 
(lines 1−3).  
─ Step 2: Sort the vector μt by the probability values. This produces a new vector 
of probabilities αt (line 4). 
─ Step 3: Compute a new state vector ωt+1 as the intersection of the current state 
vector ωt and the top k elements in αt. By using a small k, Monitor is able to 
reduce the state vector to few states. For example, taking the example in Fig. 2., 
if ωt = {SB, SD, SE, SF} and αt = [SD, SE,…, SA], by taking the top k=2 in αt the 
new state vector ωt+1 would be {SD, SE}. Notice that if the intersection of ωt and 
αt is null, we take the union of the two sets. This is a safe choice because having 
the intersection of ωt and αt equal to null implies that either the HMM or ωt is 
incorrect. This step is executed in lines 5-11. 
The time complexity of the algorithm is proportional to the time in computing P(qt = 
si |O, λ) for all the states, the time to sort the array μt, and the time to compute the 
intersection of ωt and the top k elements in αt. The vector μt can be computed in time 
O(N3T), where N is the number of states in the HMM (and the FSM), and T is the 
length of the observation sequence O. Sorting μt can be performed in O(N log N), and 
the intersection of ωt and αt[1…k] can be performed in O(Nk). Hence, the overall time 
complexity is O(N3T + N log N + Nk). In practice, the last factor tends to be N because 


















Fig. 4. Pseudo-code for reducing state vector using HMM’s estimate of probability 
of each application state. 
ReduceStateVector computes a new state vector based on: 
the HMM, an observation sequence and a previous state vector. 
Input:  λ: Hidden Markov Model; O: observation sequence O = 
{O1,  O2,…,Ot}; ωt: application’ state vector at time t; k: Filtering 
criteria for the number of probabilities estimated by the HMM 
(this is the minimum size for the new state vector ωt+1). 
Output:  ωt+1 
Variables:  μt: probability vector μt = {p1, p2,…,pN}, where pi = P( 
qt = si | O, λ ), for all i in S={s1,…,sN} (the states in the FSM) and 
qt is the state at time t; αt: sorted μt. 
 
ReduceStateVector(λ, O, ωt, k): 
1. μt ← ∅ 
2. For each i in S 
3.   Add P( qt = si | O, λ ) to μt 
4. αt ← sort(μt) by pi 
5. I ← ∅  
6. I ← ωt ∩ αt[1…k] 
7. if ( I = ∅ ) then 
8.   ωt+1 ← ωt ∪ αt[1…k] 
9. else 
10.   ωt+1 ← I 
11. return ωt+1 
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Fig. 5 shows points in time when the algorithm is invoked in StateMaintainer. 
FSMLookup(ω, n) calculates the new state vector from ω given that n consecutive 
messages have been dropped (as explained in Section 3.1). 
 
 
Fig. 5. Example of points in time when the ReduceStateVector algorithm is invoked. 
5 Experimental Testbed 
5.1 J2EE Application 
Many of today’s distributed applications, such as e-commerce and online banking, 
are implemented using the J2EE standard. We use the J2EE Duke’s Bank Application 
[15] as our experimental testbed. Duke’s Bank provides user functionalities such as 
accessing account information and performing transactions, and is representative of a 
medium-sized component-based application. It is composed of 4 web components 
(servlets and Java Server Pages) and 6 Enterprise Java Beans (EJB) components. 
Duke’s Bank is run on Glassfish v2 [16], the open-source application server from Sun 
Microsystems. Glassfish has a package called CallFlow that provides a central 
function for Monitor—a unique ID is assigned to each web interaction. It also 
provides caller and called component and method, without needing any application 
change.  
5.2 Web-users Emulator 
To evaluate our solutions in diverse scenarios such as high user request rates and 
multiple types of workload, we wrote WebStressor, a web interactions emulator. 
WebStressor takes different user profile traces and replays them by sending each 
message in the traces to the tested detection systems. Each profile trace contains 
sequences of web interactions that would be seen in CallFlow when a user of 
Duke’s Bank application is executing multiple operations. WebStressor has as 
configuration parameters: the number of concurrent users, the user think-time, and the 
Time Operations in Monitor
t11 Dropped message
ωt10 ← ReduceStateVector(λ, O, ωt10, k)
ωt11 ← FSMLookup(ωt10 , 1 dropped message)
...
t16 m16 is sampled
ωt15 ← ReduceStateVector(λ, O, ωt15, k)
ωt16 is pruned from ωt15 given m16
... (Sampled messages. Last sampled 
message at time t10.)
(Dropped messages. Last dropped 
message at time t15.)
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ramp-up delay (the time between two successive users starting to interact with the 
system). For all the experiments, we wanted to create a specific number of users at a 
fast rate and impose a high load on the systems. Therefore, we used a random think-
time between 1 and 5 seconds and a ramp-up delay of 200 milliseconds, which are 
relatively small values compared to say the TPC-W benchmark. WebStressor also has 
error injection capabilities which are explained in Section 6.5. 
5.3 Pinpoint Implementation 
Pinpoint [8] proposes an approach for tracing paths through multiple components, 
triggered by user requests. A Probabilistic Context Free Grammar (PCFG) is used to 
model normal path behavior and to detect anomalies whenever a path’s structure does 
not fit the PCFG. A PCFG has productions represented in Chomsky Normal Form 
(CNF) and each production is assigned a probability after a training phase. We call 
this implementation Pinpoint-PCFG in the paper.  
Pinpoint-PCFG has a training phase and an online detection phase. We use the 
implementation of Inside-Outside Algorithm (IO) from Brown University [17] for the 
estimation of the production probabilities to generate a stochastic CFG. Pinpoint-
PCFG is trained using the same traces from Duke’s Bank that are used to build the 
FSM and to train the HMM. 
The online part of Pinpoint-PCFG is implemented using the Cocke-Younger-
Kasami (CYK) parser algorithm [17], to parse the sequence of messages to determine 
the probability of deriving a web interaction. The probability of deriving a web 
interaction j from Pinpoint-PCFG is the product of the probabilities of productions 
used in the derivation. In our implementation, we apply a transformation to the raw 
probabilities to be able to work with small probability values. Let the web interaction 
j be derived through n productions and probability of production i be pi. We calculate 








= − ∏ . 
Note that, the higher the value of Mj for an observed web interaction, the lower is 
the probability of seeing that web interaction according to the PCFG model. We 
compute Mj for each web interaction encountered and compare it to a threshold (Mth); 
if Mj is greater then Mth, the interaction is marked as anomalous. In our experiments, 
we empirically determine the Mth value for optimal performance of Pinpoint-PCFG 
(Section 6.7). 
6 Experiments and Results 
In this section we report experiments to evaluate the performance of Monitor under 
different loads and for different types of injected errors. We also provide a 
comparative evaluation with the Pinpoint-PCFG algorithm. When we refer to 
Monitor, we mean baseline Monitor [12] with the two techniques intelligent sampling 
and HMM. The machines used have 4 processors, each an Intel Xeon 3.4 GHz with 
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1024 MB of memory and 1024 KB of L1 cache. All experiments are run with 
exclusive access to the machine. We show 95% confidence intervals for some 
representative plots, but not all, to keep the graphs readable. 
6.1 Measuring the Benefits of Sampling  
Our first experiment is aimed to validate if sampling is needed in Monitor for 
practical user loads. We stress the application with a load of 20 concurrent users and 
measure the average rule matching time in Monitor-baseline and Monitor with 
sampling. Rule matching time is defined as the difference in time from when a 
message arrives into Monitor to when matching the rules corresponding to this 
message completes. The measurement is done every 2 seconds in a run of 5 minutes. 
Fig. 6.(a) shows the results for this experiment. In Monitor-baseline, the time 
increases considerably to the order of minutes as the experiment continues. The trend 
will be monotonically increasing since the queue is filled faster than it is being 
drained. We observe that with the sampling scheme, rule matching time is kept 
approximately constant. This empirically demonstrates the utility of sampling. 
 
  
(a) (b) (c) 
Fig. 6. Performance results when comparing Monitor baseline, random sampling and intelligent 
sampling. (a) Average rule matching time for Monitor baseline (without sampling) and Monitor 
with sampling with 20 concurrent users; (b) Sampled values of state vector ω for Monitor with 
random and intelligent sampling; (c) CDF for the pruned state vector ω with random and 
intelligent sampling. 
6.2 Adjusting the Sampling Rate 
When experiencing high incoming rates, Monitor starts sampling messages to avoid 
the latency exceeding a threshold Lth. Beyond a certain incoming rate, the latency in 
matching rules increases continuously from milliseconds to minutes and we would 
like the Monitor to operate at a rate less than where this occurs. We call this 
Monitor’s threshold rate and denote it as Rth. We observe this threshold in Monitor 
when WebStressor emulates approximately 3 concurrent users in Duke’s Bank 
application, which we use for the experiments as the trigger for sampling in Monitor. 
This corresponds to Rth of 52 messages/sec on average. Due to the artificially low 
think time and ramp-up time, 3 users in our experiments are equivalent to a higher 
number of actual users. Also 24 concurrent users define the upper end of our 
experimental range, not the range of capabilities for either Monitor or Pinpoint-PCFG. 
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The performance of intelligent sampling is affected by the calculated sampling rate. 
The algorithm samples n messages in a window of m messages. Therefore, Monitor 
needs a fraction n/m that approximates Rs. We call this fraction the sampling factor. 
The discretization of the rate causes a discretization error for different number of 
concurrent users as shown in Table 1.. 
The selection of m in the sampling factor is a critical step since it affects the 
performance of intelligent sampling. If m is greater than the size of a web interaction, 
intelligent sampling may, in pathological cases, drop all the messages in the web 
interaction. Then a fault in the web interaction will not be detected. Therefore, to 
achieve low missed alarms, the value for m should be small, say the size of the 
smallest web interaction, which is 6 for the Duke’s Bank application. However a 
small size for m causes a large discretization error and curtails the ability of Monitor 
to select discriminating messages from within a large window. As a balance, we 
assign m=8 for the experiments. Table 1 shows the sampling factor values for 
different number of concurrent users, which maps to different message rates. 
Table 1. Sampling Factors calculated according to the number of number of concurrent users 
 
6.3 Benefits of Intelligent Sampling 
We run experiments to verify our hypothesis that intelligent sampling helps in 
reducing the size of the state vector ω. For this, we run WebStressor with a fixed 
moderate user load (8 concurrent users) and with no error injection.  This load results 
in a sampling factor 4/8. Monitor is run individually in random sampling (RS) mode, 
and in intelligent sampling (IS) mode. When a message is dropped, ω increases or 
stays constant. When a message is sampled, ω is pruned and it is passed to the 
RuleMatching engine.  
In each mode, we obtained 3337 sample values of ω’s size. Fig. 6.(b) shows 100 
snapshots of these values for RS and IS modes. Here the size of ω is shown for every 
message arriving at Monitor. The high-peaks pattern that we observe in RS mode is 
due to the deficiency of random sampling in selecting messages with small 
discriminative size. In contrast we do not observe this pattern in IS mode, because it 
preferentially samples the discriminating messages, allowing the 
StateMaintainer to produce smaller pruned state vectors ω. We notice that in 
RS mode, ω’s size can reach 31 which is the number of states in the FSM, whereas in 
4 8 12 16 20 24
Messages / sec. 70.00 118.97 194.28 236.86 314.38 362.74
Sampling rate 0.741 0.436 0.267 0.219 0.165 0.143
Sampling factor 6/8 4/8 2/8 2/8 1/8 1/8
Discretization error 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.02
Concurrent Users
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IS mode, ω’s size is bounded to 14. Also, ω’s size can increase even when sampling 





Fig. 7. Rule matching time for random sampling (RS) and intelligent sampling (IS) modes 
under sampling rates of 0.75 and 0.25 in figures (a) and (b) respectively. 
We observe also in Fig. 6.(b) that for IS mode, ω’s size is sometimes kept 1 
consecutively for 4 messages. We can observe the occurrence of this pattern once in 
the range of samples 10−20, and two times in the range of samples 20−50. In the 
Duke’s Bank application’s FSM, the most frequent discriminative size, within the 62 
types of messages, is 1. Therefore, as the intelligent sampling algorithm tries to 
sample these messages preferentially, it is likely to repeatedly attain ω of size 1. Our 
ultimate goal, regardless of the sampling algorithm, is ω of size 1 since the 
application in reality is in one state at any point in time.  
Next, we measure ω’s size only after it is pruned. Recall that the pruned state vector 
ω is the one used for rule instantiation and matching. Hence, it is at this point that it is 
critical to have a small ω for improved detection quality and latency. Fig. 6.(c) shows 
the cumulative distribution function (CDF) for the observed values of ω’s size. In IS 
mode, ω’s size of 1 has a higher frequency of occurrence (about 83%) than in RS 
mode (60%). In contrast, all ω’s size values > 1 have higher frequency of occurrence 
in RS than in IS. After being pruned, ω can have a maximum size of 7. This is due to 
the nature of Duke’s Bank application in which the maximum discriminative size of a 
message is 7.  
As more direct proof of the benefit of IS, we measure the average rule matching 
time for IS and RS modes. Fig. 7.(a)−(b)shows the average rule matching time under 
two sampling rate conditions: 0.75 and 0.25. The set of rules is fixed to 80%, and no 
error injection is performed. The HMM-based state vector reduction is also disabled 
to avoid including its overhead in these measurements. 
 The average rule matching time for Monitor with IS is lower than for RS for all 
cases. Even though IS incurs the additional overhead of determining the type of 
messages and looking up its discriminative size, the reduction of the state vector size 
more than compensates for it. For a sampling rate of 0.25, for IS the rule matching 
time remains negligible (< 1 sec) for incoming message rates less than 350 
messages/sec. This supports the fact that Monitor’s detection delay is in the order of 
milliseconds for up to 24 concurrent users (equivalent to 362.74 messages/sec). 
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6.4 Definition of Performance Metrics 
We introduce the metrics that we use to evaluate detection quality. Let W denote the 
entire set of web interactions generated in the application in one experimental run. For 
W, we collect the following variables, I: out of W, the web interactions where faults 
were injected; D: out of W, the web interactions in which Monitor detected a failure; 
C: out of I, the web interactions in which Monitor detected a failure (these are the 
correct detections). 
Based on these variables, we calculate two metrics: 
Accuracy = |C| / |I|; Precision = |C| / |D| 
Accuracy expresses how well the detection system is able to identify the web 
interactions in which problems occurred, while precision is a measure of the inverse 
of false alarms in the system. 
Another performance metric is the latency of detection. Let Ti denote the time when 
a fault is injected and Td the time when the failure caused by the injected fault is 
detected by the detection system. We define detection latency as Td – Ti. When a 
delay δ is injected (emulating a performance problem in a component of the 
application), δ is subtracted from the total time since it represents only a characteristic 
of the injected fault and not the quality of the detection system. 
It may be useful to identify a problem in a web interaction even before the web 
interaction finishes. For example, if during the sequence of calls between components 
in a web interaction, we detect a problem in a subcomponent, we may want to prevent 
subsequent subcomponents from being called. This can help in preventing the 
propagation of error to subsequent subcomponents and in diagnosing the root cause of 
the problem. If a detection system achieves detection before the web interaction 
completes, we say the system has a pre-detection latency, else we refer to it as a post-
detection latency. In Pinpoint-PCFG, a complete web interaction must be observed to 
perform error detection, while in Monitor detection is performed without needing to 
look at the entire web interaction. Therefore, Pinpoint-PCFG always has post-
detection, while Monitor may have pre- or post-detection. 
6.5 Error Injection Model 
Errors are injected by WebStressor at runtime when mimicking concurrent users. 
This results in errors in the application traces which are fed to the detection systems. 
We inject four kinds of errors that occur in real operating scenarios: 
1. Response delay: a delay d is selected randomly between 100 msec and 500 msec, 
and is injected in a particular subcomponent. This error simulates subcomponent’s 
response delays due to performance problems. 
2. Null Call: a called subcomponent is never executed. This error terminates the web 
interaction prematurely and the client receives a generic error report, e.g., HTTP 
500 internal server error. 
3. Runtime Exception: an undeclared exception, or a declared exception that is not 
masked by the application, is thrown. As in null calls, the web interaction is 
terminated prematurely and the client receives an error report. 
18 Ignacio Laguna, Fahad A. Arshad, David M. Grothe, Saurabh Bagchi 
4. Incorrect Message Sequences: an error that occurs for which there is an exception 
handler that invokes an error handling sequence. This sequence changes the normal 
structure of the web interaction. We emulate this by replacing the calls and returns 
in N consecutive subcomponents. The value of N is selected randomly between 1 
and 5.  
Of these, Pinpoint-PCFG cannot detect response delay errors. We perform 
comparative evaluation of Monitor with Pinpoint-PCFG for the other error types. 
6.6 Detecting Performance Problems  
For this experiment we inject delays to simulate performance problems in the set of 
5 subcomponents listed in Table 2.. 





Fig. 8. ROC curves generated by varying the percentage of rules in Monitor. 
 
Fig. 9. Accuracy and precision of Monitor in detecting performance delays for three type of 
rules. 
A category of errors that is difficult to detect is transient errors—those that are 
caused by unpredictable random events and that are difficult to reproduce and isolate. 
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We want to test Monitor in detecting this category of errors. In order to mimic this 
scenario in our injection strategy, we inject delays only 20% of the time a 
subcomponent in Table 2. is touched in a web interaction. 
Before running the experiment, we determine the best set of parameter values in 
Monitor. We generate ROC (Receiver Operating Characteristic) curves by varying 
their configuration parameters and the imposed load of users to the application. We 
use two kinds of loads: low load (4 concurrent users), and high load (20 concurrent 
users). Once the ROC curves are generated, we select the operational point as the one 
closest to the ideal point (0, 1); in case of a tie, we use the point with the better 
precision. 
We vary two parameters for Monitor: the size of the rulebase and k in the HMM-
based state vector reduction algorithm. Rulebase size is varied by activating randomly 
only 20%, 40%, 60% or 80% of the exhaustive list of rules, while k is varied over 1 
and 2. Fig. 8. shows the ROC curves for k=2 (k=1 is not shown for lack of space). We 
observe that increasing the % of rules increases the accuracy both in low and high 
load, while we do not observe a consistent pattern in the variation of precision. The 
variation of k does not significantly affect the dispersion of points in the ROC curves. 
We select Monitor’s best configuration parameters as rulebase size of 80% and k=2 
and use it for the delay error experiments.  
For the performance delay rules, first, we measure the average (μ) and standard 
deviation (σ) of the response time from the components in the application during the 
training phase. We then create rules with the following thresholds for response times 
in each component: μ±σ, μ±2σ and μ±3σ.  
Fig. 9. shows the results of this experiment. We observe that using μ±2σ provides 
the best combination of accuracy and precision. Rules of the type μ±σ provide the 
highest accuracy but poor precision, while rules of the type μ±3σ provide accuracy 
levels a bit less than μ±2σ and similar precision levels. For rule types μ±σ and μ±2σ 
we observe a decrease in accuracy of about 10% as concurrent users are increased 
from 4 to 16, and an increase in the same order of magnitude as users are increased to 
24. The reason for the increase in accuracy is due to the precision rate that decreases 
rapidly after 16 concurrent users. Because of the large rate of false alarms generated 
after this point, accuracy is increased as a trade-off. The decrease in precision happens 
since when the application is stressed with a high load, the response times increase 
naturally, causing Monitor to flag more false alarms. In future, we can improve 
precision by making the delay rules adapt to the number of concurrent users. 
6.7 Detecting Anomalous Web Interactions 
We evaluate Monitor’s performance in detecting anomalous web interactions by 
injecting null calls, runtime exceptions and incorrect message sequences. We also 
evaluate Pinpoint-PCFG’s performance here. 
Monitor detects anomalous web interactions at the StateMaintainer. If an 
event is unexpected according to the current state in Monitor’s state vector, an error is 
flagged. This avoids the need for explicit rules for this type of detection. For the 
Duke’s Bank application, if the correct state is Sc and the state vector after a message 
is sampled and pruning is completed, is ω, then we find empirically that in all cases Sc 
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∈ ω. Thus, a detection happens at Monitor only if the message is incorrect, i.e., there 
is an actual fault. This gives a precision value of 1 for Monitor’s detection of 
anomalous web interactions in Duke’s Bank. 
For this experiment, first, we empirically determine the best value of parameter k for 
the HMM-based state vector reduction algorithm. Fig. 10(a) shows Monitor running 
with different values of k while we inject anomalous web interactions. Parameter k=0 
represents Monitor running without HMM. We can observe that, with no HMM, in 
both low and high loads, accuracy is very low (about 0.4). For k=2 in low load and 
k=1 in high load, accuracy reaches its highest value. We observe that as we vary k, for 
low load, accuracy remains almost the same (0.9), whereas it decreases substantially 
in high load (reaching a minimum of about 0.55). This result validates our design that 
HMM is useful in detecting anomalous web interactions since Monitor with k > 0 
performs better than with k = 0. In high load, two conditions cause Monitor to have a 
decreasing accuracy with increasing k. Monitor samples less often leading to an 
increase in the size of ω. With large k, few states get pruned and if the observed 
erroneous message is possible in any of the remaining states of ω, the error is not 
detected. Second, under high load, when the erroneous message may not be sampled, 
the HMM is particularly important. Increasing k effectively reduces the impact of the 
HMM, since even states with low probabilities given by the HMM are considered. For 
the remaining experiments, we use k=1 as it allows Monitor to have the best accuracy 
in both low and high load.  
Second, we determine the best configuration parameter setting for Pinpoint-PCFG. 
We vary the threshold Mth to get Pinpoint-PCFG’s ROC curves under low and high 
load. Fig. 10(b)−(c) show the results of this experiment. A lower value of threshold 
generates more false positives. A very high value on the other hand generates missed 
alarms. We select Mth = 350 as the operating point for Pinpoint-PCFG.  
Fig. 10(d)−(e) show the results for accuracy and precision of Monitor and Pinpoint-
PCFG. We observe that on average, Monitor’s accuracy is comparable to Pinpoint-
PCFG. In Monitor, accuracy decreases for higher loads due to dropping more 
messages in a sampling widow. As the load increases, Pinpoint-PCFG maintains a 
high accuracy because it is not dropping messages—messages are being enqueued for 
eventual processing. However its latency of detection suffers significantly in high 
loads—it is in the order of seconds (Fig. 10(g)) while in Monitor it is in the order of 
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(a) (b) (c) 
 
 




Fig. 10. Performance results for Monitor and Pinpoint when detecting anomalous web 
interactions. (a) Accuracy in Monitor when varying parameter k in the HMM-based state vector 
reduction algorithm; (b)−(c) ROC curves for Pinpoint-PCFG where points are generated by 
varying the threshold Mth; (d)−(e) Accuracy and precision for Monitor and Pinpoint-PCFG; 
(f)−(g)Detection latency for Monitor and Pinpoint-PCFG. 
 We observe the robustness of Pinpoint-PCFG to false positives as it maintains on 
average almost the same precision (0.9) with increasing number of users. However, 
the precision in Pinpoint-PCFG is lower than that in Monitor of 1.0. 
An important property of a PCFG is that since the grammar is context-free, the 
PCFG represents a super-set of the observed web interactions seen in the traces used 
for training. Thus it can match some patterns that were not seen in the training phase. 
Still there are some patterns that are normal but since they were not seen in the 
training phase, generate a false alarm. 
We observe that Monitor has a pre-detection latency fraction that varies from 8.93% 
to 22.67%, for the different numbers of concurrent users. Pinpoint-PCFG has only 
post-detection latency since it needs to see the entire web interaction before flagging 
an error. 
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 The high detection latency in Pinpoint-PCFG is due to the fact that the parsing 
algorithm in the PCFG has time complexity O(L3) and space complexity O(RL2), 
where R is the number of rules in the grammar and L is the size of a web interaction. 
In the Duke’s Bank application we observe that the maximum length of a web 
interaction is 256 messages, and the weighted average size is 70. Previous work [18] 
has shown that the time to parse sentences of length 40 can be 120 seconds even with 
optimized parameters. Moreover, in Pinpoint-PCFG, error detection can only be 
performed after the end of web interactions which also explains longer detection 
latencies than in Monitor. Another cause of the high latency in Pinpoint-PCFG is the 
large amount of virtual memory that the process takes (933.56 MB for a load of 24 
concurrent users as shown in Table 3.. This makes the Pinpoint-PCFG process thrash.  
6.8 Fine-Grained Detection of Performance Problems 
We evaluate the performance of random and intelligent sampling in detecting 
performance delays. For this experiment, we use similar definitions for accuracy and 
precision as in the previous experiments, but we change the granularity of detection 
from web interactions to individual subcomponents. The rationale behind this 
changed definition is that IS is expected to instantiate a smaller subset of rules, 
relevant to the correct subcomponents, than RS. Thus, if our granularity of detection 
is the entire web interaction, then they may perform comparably⎯RS may flag a rule 
related to any of the touched subcomponents in the interaction, even a non-faulty 
subcomponent. IS, on the other hand, is more likely to flag a rule specifically for the 
faulty subcomponent. This difference can be brought out by defining accuracy and 
precision at the level of subcomponents. Detection at the level of a subcomponent this 
level is helpful in diagnosis—finding the root cause of the problem—since it helps in 
pinpointing suspect subcomponents. 
Variables I, D, and C are now defined as: I: the subcomponents where faults were 
injected; D: the subcomponents in which Monitor detected a failure; C: out of I, the 
subcomponents in which Monitor detected a failure (these are the correct detections). 
Accuracy and Precision are defined (as in Section 6.3) as |C|/|I| and |C|/|D|. 
 
Fig. 11. Accuracy and Precision for Random Sampling and Intelligent Sampling for 
performance delay errors. 
We inject delays in the same subcomponents used in Section 6.6, while varying the 
number of concurrent users. Fig. 11. shows the results of the experiment. We observe 
that accuracy and precision are higher for IS for most loads (4−16 concurrent users). 
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Although, for high loads (20 and 24 users), random and intelligent sampling exhibit 
almost the same (poor) performance.  
6.9 Memory Consumption 
We measure average memory consumption for Monitor and Pinpoint-PCFG under a 
load of 24 concurrent users. Physical and virtual memory usage are collected every 5 
seconds by reading the /proc file system and averaged over the duration of each 
experimental run. Table 3. shows the results of this experiment. The size of a three-
dimensional array for each web interaction encountered uses a large amount of virtual 
memory for Pinpoint-PCFG. 
Table 3. Memory consumption for the compared systems 
 
7 Efficient Rule Matching 
In order to improve the performance of Monitor, we present a mechanism for 
efficient rule matching. As the load in Monitor depends on the processing overhead 
per incoming message, reduction in rule matching overhead will result in a reduction 
in Monitor’s load. Rules that are computationally expensive are strong candidates for 
efficient matching since they cause Monitor to devote most of its resources to them.  
Suppose that at time t, a message mt is observed, a rule R has to be matched in the 
RuleMatching engine, and a sequence of the n previously observed messages  
{mt-n , mt-n+1 ,…, mt-1} are kept in a buffer B. Our efficient rule matching mechanism 
works as follows: 
 
1. Monitor estimates the probability P that, given the previous sequence of 
observed messages B,  if R is matched, an error will be caught. 
2. If P is greater than a threshold Pth, then R is matched. Otherwise, B becomes 
{mt-n+1,…, mt} and the RuleMatching engine goes to the step (1). 
 
The challenge of this mechanism, given a rule R, is to estimate the model for P and 
the corresponding threshold value Pth that produce the best results in terms of catching 
an error, i.e., that maximize accuracy and precision of detection. While presenting a 
general theoretical approach for estimating the model and threshold for any rule is out 
of the scope of this paper, we present a simple example in which this technique can be 
used to efficiently detect a memory leak in the Apache Tomcat web server[23]. 
Apache Tomcat is an open-source web server written in Java that implements the Java 
Servlet and the JavaServer Pages (JSP) technologies from Sun Microsystems. 
Virtual Memory Memory in RAM
Monitor 282.27 25.53
Pinpoint-PCFG 933.56 696.06
Average Memory Usage (MB)
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7.1 Memory Leak Injection 
We instrumented the Apache Tomcat web server source code to inject a memory 
leak. Upon receiving a legitimate request, an unused object is created with probability 
pleak, and it is kept referenced while the server runs so that it is not taken by the Java 
garbage collector. The result is an increase of memory usage that can be observed 
from the Java process running the server. 
 
 
Fig. 12. Percentage of memory usage of the Apache Tomcat web server under normal 
conditions and with a memory leak fault injection. 
 
We perform experiments to observe the pattern of the memory consumption of the 
web server in both in normal conditions and when the memory leak is injected. We 
use a test-bet of an e-commerce site that simulates the operation of an online store 
according the TPC-W benchmark[24]. We use the benchmark WIPSo mixture (50% 
browsing and 50% ordering) that is intended to simulate a web site with a significant 
percentage of order requests.  Fig. 12 shows the results of the experiment when the 
probability pleak of the memory leak injection is set to 0.5, and when a load of 50 
concurrent users on average is imposed. Measurements are taken in a fixed interval of 
1 second for a window of 10 minutes after the server is started. 
7.2 Modeling Memory Consumption 
Previous work on software rejuvenation[25] has proposed the use of time series 
analysis to model memory usage patterns in the Apache web server.  In software 
rejuvenation techniques, time series analysis is used to understand aging and to 
predict when to reboot the server in order to avoid future failures. In this paper, we 
use time series analysis to build rules that are able to pinpoint a memory leak and that 
help us to demonstrate our efficient rule matching technique. In particular, the web 
server memory consumption is modeled as an autoregressive (AR) moving average 
(MA) process ARMA(p, q). This process is formally defined as follows[26]: 
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∑ ∑ , 
where εt is the error term, C is a constant, and {ϕ1, …, ϕp} and {θ1, …, θp} 
are the parameters of the model. 
 
• The error term εt is considered to be white noise, i.e., independently and 
identically distributed with mean 0 and variance σ2. 
 
We collect training data in several runs of the Apache Tomcat server for generating 
two ARMA(p, q) models λ and λ’ that represent memory usage under normal 
conditions and memory leak conditions respectively. The models are inferred by 
maximum likelihood estimation by using the statistical tool R[27]. In order to 
estimate the number of p and q parameters that best fit the models, whiling trying to 
keep these numbers small, we vary p and q over 1, 2, and 3.  We then select the 
number of p and q that produce the minimum root-mean-square (RMS) error when 
comparing test data and new data generated with the models. For our test-bed, p=3 
and q=2 resulted in the best configuration for the models. 
7.3 Rule Matching Latency Reduction 
After the two models λ and λ’ are trained, we build a rule for detecting the memory 
leak in the web server by observing to which model the test data fits better. When the 
rule is matched at runtime, it takes as input a sequence B of n new observed messages 
from the Apache Tomcat web server in which it will look for errors. Then, two 
simulated sequences S and S’ are generated from the two models λ and λ′ respectively 
using previous observed data values, and they are compared to B by measuring the 
RMS error. If B fits better in S’, i.e., its RMS error is less than the one for S, an error 
is flag by the rule indicating a possible trend of high memory consumption. 
To observe the effectiveness of selectively matching this rule we use a simple 
mechanism for evaluating P, the probability of catching the error if the rule is 
matched. We use indication of instability in the system as a mechanism for having a 
meaningful value of P. We measure the standard deviation σ of the m previous 
observed values of memory consumption, and if it is greater than a threshold Pth, then 
the rule is matched. Notice that, in order to observe a reduction on the workload of 
Monitor, the overhead in evaluating P has to be less than the overhead of evaluating 
the whole rule; otherwise it may me better matching the rule directly. 








Allways matched yes 19.2835
σ ≥ 0.5 yes 7.1148
σ ≥ 1.0 no 1.25
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Table 4. Detection coverage and average rule matching delay the ARMA-based 
rule. shows the results for 3 different configurations in Monitor when the memory 
leak is injected in the web server: (1) the rule is always matched, (2) the rule is 
matched only if σ ≥ 0.5 in the last m messages, and (3) the rule is matched only if σ ≥ 
1.0 in the last m messages.  For the three experiments, m = 5 and the same workload 
that we used for training is imposed to the web server. The initial values of 0.5 and 
1.0 for σ are taken from the average standard deviation observed in the training data 
set for the web server running under normal conditions.  
As presented in table 4, in these experiments we observe whether the rule flags the 
memory leak, and the average rule matching latency in Monitor, which is defined as 
the time spent by Monitor to provide an answer on each incoming message, where the 
answer can be either the system is operating normally or an error is detected.  We 
notice that when the rule is always matched, the average latency is the maximum as 
expected, and as we increase σ, the latency decreases. This is due to an inherent 
reduction in the chances of matching the ARMA-based rule which is more 
computationally expensive than evaluating σ. However, if σ is too low, the error may 
not be caught as it is the case when σ=1.0. 
8 Related Work 
Error Detection in Distributed Systems:  Previous approaches of error detection in 
distributed systems have varied from heartbeats to watchdogs. However, these 
designs have looked at a restricted set of errors (such as, livelocks) as compared to 
our work, or depended on alerts from the monitored components. 
A recent work closely related to ours is Pinpoint [8]. Authors present an approach 
for tracing paths from user requests and use a Probabilistic Context Free Grammar 
(PCFG) to model normal path behavior as seen during a training phase. A path’s 
structure is then considered anomalous if it significantly deviates from a pattern that 
can be derived from the PCFG. Pinpoint however does not consider the problem of 
dealing with high rates of requests. We provide a comparative evaluation of Monitor 
with Pinpoint in Section 6.7. A variant of the Pinpoint work [22] uses a weighting for 
long web interactions so that they are not mistakenly flagged as erroneous. This 
weighting seems less useful for Duke’s Bank since the probabilities for the less likely 
transitions differ significantly from the expected probability. This work also uses an 
additional parameter (α) to pick a particular point in the false alarm-missed alarm 
spectrum. We believe that an equivalent effect is achieved through our ROC-based 
characterization.  
Performance Modeling and Debugging in Distributed Systems:  There is recent 
activity in providing tools for debugging problems in distributed applications, notably 
Project5 [9][10] and Magpie[7]. These approaches provide tools for collecting trace 
information at different levels of granularity which are used for automatic analysis, 
often offline, to determine the possible root causes of the problem.  
Project5’s main goal is detecting performance characteristics in black-box 
distributed systems. In [9] models for performance delays on RPC-style and message-
based application for LAN environments are proposed—authors focus on finding 
How To Keep Your Head Above Water While Detecting Errors  27 
causal path patterns with unexpected timing or shape. In [10] authors present an 
algorithm for performance debugging in wide-area systems. We determined that this 
work’s focus is on determining the performance characteristics of different 
components in a complete black-box manner. Since Project 5 does not assume a 
uniform middleware, such as J2EE, it cannot assign a unique identifier to all messages 
in a causal path as they occur. We use the GlassFish-assigned unique identifier to a 
path of causal request-responses. In our work, we use both these features. However, 
Project5's accuracy suffers greatly when detecting anomalous patterns under 
concurrent load (in fairness, this is not the goal of the work either).  Therefore, we did 
not perform a quantitative comparison with Project5 for detecting performance 
problems (in Section 6.6).  
The Magpie project [7] is complementary to our work—it is a tool that helps in 
understanding system behavior for the purposes of performance analysis and 
debugging in distributed applications. Magpie collects CPU usage and disk access for 
user requests as they travel though the system components. These models can be used 
for capacity planning, performance debugging, and anomaly detection. The workload 
models of request behavior can be used in Monitor to specify rules for detection of 
performance bottlenecks. 
Other powerful tools have also been proposed recently. For example, in [11] authors 
present a tool called liblog that aids in recreating the events that occurred prior to and 
during failure.  
Stateful Intrusion Detection in High Throughput Streams:  In the area of intrusion 
detection, techniques have been proposed to allow network-based intrusion detection 
systems (NIDS) to keep up with high network bandwidths by parallelizing the 
workload [1] and by efficient pattern matching [2]. Although distributing the 
detection load in multiple machines helps, this does not solve the fundamental 
problem of how to manage the resource usage in individual machines, which we 
address. This work looks for problems at the network level while we look at 
application level deviations from expected behavior. 
Sampling Techniques for Anomaly Detection:  Recently there is an increased effort 
in finding network failures, anomalies and attacks through changes in high-speed 
network links. For example, in [3] authors propose a sketch-based approach, where a 
sketch is a set of hash tables that models data as a series of (key, value) pairs; key can 
be a source/destination IP address, and the value  can be the number of bytes or 
packets. A sketch can provide accurate probabilistic estimates of the changes in 
values for a key. Sampling has also been used in high-speed links as input for 
anomaly detection [4][5], for example, for detecting denial-of-service (DoS) attacks 
or worm scans. However, some studies show that these sampling techniques introduce 
fundamental bias that depredates performance when detecting network anomalies 
(e.g., in [6]). Our work matches rules based on aggregated information at the 
application level, while this work matches rules based on network level statistics of 
the traffic.  
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9 Conclusions and Limitations 
This paper presents an intelligent sampling algorithm and an HMM-based technique 
to enable stateful error detection in high throughput streams. The techniques are 
applied and tested in the Monitor detection system and provide a high quality of 
detection (accuracy and precision) for a range of real-world errors in distributed 
applications with low detection latency. It compares favorably to an existing detection 
system for distributed component-based systems called Pinpoint. We also present a 
mechanism for efficiently matching rules that can be computationally expensive 
based on the observation that rules will more likely catch errors if instability in the 
system is observed. 
A disadvantage of our HMM-based technique is that an application with a large 
number of states can make the HMM processing too expensive. For the Duke’s Bank 
application with 62 states, use of the HMM is beneficial as evidenced by the 
improvement in detection precision. Even when our HMM takes as input complete 
sequences of messages, the computational cost of this is less than sampling all the 
messages. It is a subject of future work to determine what size of the FSM would 
cause a cross-over beyond which HMM execution will have to be done with 
incomplete sequence of messages, which will call for a novel algorithm itself. 
Another limitation of Monitor is that in sampling mode some states may not be 
examined. If such a state happens to contain the error condition, Monitor will miss 
flagging it since rules associated with that state would not be instantiated. In future 
work we will address this problem by developing a sampling scheme that allows 
Monitor to preferably sample messages (or sequence of messages) that will point to 
erroneous conditions in the application. 
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